European defence : give PESCO a chance by Biscop, Sven
It is easier to deal with an open objection than with a profession of 
agreement in principle which covers an underlying reluctance to translate 
it into practice. While clear opposition presents an obstacle that can be 
surmounted, hesitant acquiescence acts as a constant break on progress.
Basil H. Liddell Hart1
Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s remarks about his attempts to promote the reform 
of the British Army between the two world wars unwittingly capture the 
current state of European defence. At their 1998 Saint-Malo Summit, the UK 
and France initiated the creation of a military arm for the European Union, 
now known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Ever 
since, EU member states have consistently claimed that more cooperation 
between their armed forces is the only way to significantly increase military 
capability. Successive projects have been proposed, yet none has ever really 
been implemented. 
Sceptics can therefore be forgiven for eyeing the EU’s latest initiative, 
known as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with some suspicion 
– not least because the EU has already tried and failed to activate PESCO, in 
2010 after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.2 Yet the latest attempt, 
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formally launched in December 2017, feels different. Success is obviously 
not guaranteed, but seems more likely in this case than in the past. 
Why PESCO is different 
The EU’s Council of Ministers decided to establish PESCO on 8 December 
2017, with the involvement of 25 member states – all but the UK (for obvious 
reasons), Denmark (which has a standing opt-out from the CSDP) and 
Malta.3 The remaining 25 members have signed up to 20 commitments. 
The most tangible of these is the obligation to take part in at least one 
of a list of capability projects that the participating states agree to be ‘stra-
tegically relevant’. This obligation is linked to a general commitment to 
help address, through collaborative projects, the common capability short-
falls that the EU identifies, and to look for collaborative options first even 
when filling a national shortfall. Furthermore, all projects should help 
make the European defence industry more competitive and avoid unnec-
essary overlap, thus supporting the European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base. Member states have also committed to make available stra-
tegically deployable formations, in addition to the battalion-strength EU 
Battlegroups, in order to achieve the EU’s military level of ambition, and to 
provide substantial support every time the EU launches an actual operation. 
All of this comes at a price, hence states have further committed to ‘reg-
ularly increas[e] defence budgets in real terms, in order to reach agreed 
objectives’, as well as to allocate 20% of their defence spending to invest-
ment, and 2% to research and technology (R&T). The ‘agreed objectives’ 
in question are not spelled out, because many states will likely never reach 
the objective that they signed up to as NATO members to spend 2% of GDP 
on defence. The fact that the NATO allies had already committed to the 
2% threshold made it impossible, however, for the EU to specify a lower 
number. A commitment under PESCO to spend 20% on investment and 
2% on R&T means that states that now spend two-thirds or more of their 
defence budget on salaries will be forced to increase their budgets. 
What makes PESCO different from previous initiatives? Firstly, because 
Council decisions are legally binding, PESCO, unlike other initiatives, will 
not go away. Previous schemes typically fizzled out after a year or two once 
European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance   |  163 
it became clear that states were not actually going to do anything. Not so 
PESCO: because it has been written into EU law, the Council of Ministers will 
annually assess whether the member states are fulfilling their commitments, 
on the basis of a report by the High Representative. The states themselves are 
required to produce an annual National Implementation Plan. As with the 
NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), this does not guarantee that states 
will meet all of their targets, but does mean that they will have to explain any 
failure to do so to their fellow member states, as well as to their publics and 
parliaments. Moreover, the commitment to enter into collaborative capabil-
ity projects will mean collective engagements, which are more difficult to 
renege on: once a state commits to a specific multinational project, it cannot 
withdraw without incurring the wrath of the other states taking part. In this 
area at least, the participating states will serve to keep each other in line, 
potentially making PESCO more forceful than the NDPP. 
PESCO may come with a stick, but for the first time there is also a carrot. 
The European Commission has proposed a European Defence Fund that, 
as of the next budgetary cycle (2021–27), will include a ‘development 
window’ of up to €5 billion per year, from which up to 20% can be funded 
from the EU budget, for multinational projects that address a commonly 
identified shortfall.4 For projects falling within the PESCO framework, an 
additional bonus of 10% is foreseen. Compared to the €35bn or so that the 
PESCO states annually spend on investment today, that is not a negligi-
ble sum. Of course, the EU budget also comes from the member states, but 
the European Defence Fund represents a new pot of common funding. If 
it is used to launch a limited number of key projects, it may help to orient 
member states’ decisions. 
Whereas defence was traditionally seen to fall outside its remit, the EU 
Commission has now become a key driver of the defence debate within 
the EU. That is good news, given that things usually advance once the 
Commission puts its shoulder to the wheel. Even more importantly, the 
initiative to launch PESCO came not from Brussels, but from member states, 
who took it upon themselves to enhance their defence effort without being 
exhorted to by the US, NATO or the EU. France and Germany took the 
initiative at a bilateral summit on 13 July 2017, tabling a detailed proposal 
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that was underwritten by Italy and Spain. Belgium, Estonia, Finland and 
the Netherlands were also invited to co-sign the proposal and its successive 
updates.5 Strong Franco-German leadership led to the countries’ proposals 
being adopted in record time: less than half a year elapsed between the 
Franco-German summit and the Council decision. 
Making PESCO work 
Continued leadership will be necessary to ensure that PESCO fulfils its 
potential and does not fall victim to its own success. In its current form, it 
embodies a compromise between France and Germany as to the number of 
states that have joined it. The French expectation was that a core group of 
around a dozen members would pull the others along, and therefore Paris 
emphasised ambitious criteria, conceiving of PESCO as a platform to gener-
ate forces for operations. Germany, on the other hand, had a more inclusive 
vision. Both views were to shape the ultimate outcome, but it is clear that 
PESCO was not designed to have so many members. All decision-making, 
except when it comes to the admission of new members, is unanimous, a 
set-up that has had consequences from the start, notably for the first list of 
17 PESCO projects.6 
‘Medical HQ to Spearhead EU Military Push’ read one implicitly scep-
tical headline when the list was announced.7 In fact, deployable medical 
assets constitute a real strategic shortfall, and no government will deploy 
its troops if medical support is not available. But most of the other pro-
jects, while useful for the states that proposed them, do not meet any of 
the collectively identified European shortfalls. In many cases, the states 
concerned were going to undertake them anyway, PESCO or no PESCO. A 
prior assessment by the EU Military Staff told member states as much, but 
the suggestion that it should formally validate project proposals was dis-
carded. France and Germany had initially aimed at five to ten projects, but 
when it became clear that member states were joining en masse, it became 
politically impossible not to accept at least some of their project proposals 
(nearly 50 in total). Nor could Paris and Berlin simply impose their views 
on the others; indeed, they dropped some of their own projects to keep the 
list to a manageable number. On the bright side, some of the projects are 
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expected to produce results in the near term, which will serve to demon-
strate the value of PESCO to political leaders and publics alike, and help to 
keep the momentum going. 
Nevertheless, this lack of focus should be rectified in the next round 
of project proposals, scheduled to take place before the end of 2018. For 
PESCO to add real value, it must focus on projects that, because they require 
a large critical mass of participating states and address a common rather 
than a national shortfall, would not otherwise happen – projects that really 
are ‘strategically relevant’, such as long-range air and sea transport; intel-
ligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (from drones 
to satellites); air-to-air refuelling; and deployable networks. These are the 
strategic enablers that Europeans need to project military force beyond 
the borders of Europe. Some EU members may acquire a limited national 
capacity in some of these areas, but certainly not enough to allow them to 
conduct significant operations without relying on US assets. Most simply 
cannot afford any capacity at all in these areas, except at the expense of their 
basic war-fighting capabilities. 
The first list of PESCO projects does not distinguish between ‘strategi-
cally relevant’ projects and others. It would be advisable if the next one did. 
All projects could count towards PESCO states’ general obligation to engage 
in collaborative projects, but states should be obliged to participate in at 
least one ‘strategically relevant’ project. By limiting the number of these to 
three to five per annual round of projects, PESCO could generate the critical 
mass that each of them needs. (Of course, this would present the politi-
cal difficulty of telling some states that their projects are less relevant than 
others.) Ideally, PESCO would only use Commission co-funding for the 
strategic projects, given that scattering the means of the European Defence 
Fund across a plethora of projects will greatly reduce its effectiveness. 
A system to assess member states’ performance in terms of their PESCO 
commitments is already in place, and the Council is scheduled, before 
summer 2018, to specify more precise objectives and to sequence their ful-
filment in two phases (2018–20 and 2021–25). But developing a culture of 
compliance will be crucial. The only sanction provided for non-compliance, 
once a state has been given a time frame for consultation and rectifying the 
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situation, is suspension from PESCO, a nuclear option that is unlikely to 
be used. Yet member states must be made to understand that they cannot 
join PESCO just to make up the numbers. This will require clear and firm 
language (something the EU is not necessarily known for) in the annual 
report on every state’s performance, as well as complete transparency so as 
to generate pressure both from peers and the public. Most importantly, the 
original authors of the PESCO proposal, namely France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain, must lead by example.8 They must demonstrate not only that they are 
implementing the commitments in full, but also that they truly respect the 
spirit of PESCO, and put the collective European interest first. It is incum-
bent upon them to propose genuinely strategic projects that smaller states 
do not have the scale to initiate. 
France and Germany set the course at their July 2017 bilateral summit, at 
which they announced joint initiatives to develop major land-combat, artil-
lery and maritime-patrol systems, as well as a combat aircraft (among other 
projects), while confirming their support for the Eurodrone programme 
with Italy and Spain. These initiatives represent a departure from the status 
quo, under which European states seek to satisfy their own national require-
ments for any new equipment. A host of companies will usually compete 
for national contracts, which typically represent only a very small share of 
the market as each state requests its own national variant of the equipment 
on offer. If, however, Paris and Berlin, along with Rome and Madrid (the 
‘big four’), were to systematically join hands and harmonise requirements 
in all major capability areas under the auspices of PESCO, Europeans could 
finally be in a position to design, build and procure a single system in each 
domain. Like in the US, there could still be competition between two or 
three big industrial consortia, but in the end Europeans too would opt for a 
single project, which would then be significantly more competitive, includ-
ing vis-à-vis the American alternatives on the market. 
If the big four were thus to gradually integrate requirements and pro-
curement, the other EU members would have no choice but to join in. 
Lacking the necessary scale to launch alternative projects, their national 
defence industries (comprising mostly small and medium-sized enterprises) 
would not survive outside the large consortia competing for big-four pro-
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jects. Indeed, not even the big four are capable of reaching the critical mass 
of investors and customers needed to make a project economically viable 
without the participation of other members. This implies that the defence 
firms of smaller states will have a fair chance of joining the main consortia. 
A cultural shift is clearly needed that only France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain can initiate. If they are serious about PESCO, they must abandon all 
protectionism, including offsets (the practice of returning money spent on 
procurement in another country to a purchasing state in the form of sub-
contracts to its own defence industry, or even investments in other economic 
sectors), in defence procurement. This may seem a distant prospect, but the 
alternative – national defence industries engaging in ruinous competition 
that ultimately leaves Europe with no defence industry at all – is already on 
the horizon. For its part, the European Commission has sent a strong signal 
by taking legal action, for the first time, against EU member states accused 
of violating EU defence-market legislation. Italy, Poland and Portugal have 
been cited for awarding contracts to national industries without public 
tender, and Denmark and the Netherlands for demanding undue offsets. 
Towards integration 
The implementation of PESCO is understandably focused on capability pro-
jects, its most tangible dimension. But the fact that states participating in any 
given project will acquire the same equipment could serve as the founda-
tion for more integrated forces, in which any additional capabilities can be 
operated in the most cost-effective way. Once a project has been completed, 
it only makes sense for the resulting capability to be co-owned, as part of 
a unified force, by all the states that helped to develop it, rather than being 
divided between them. This would apply in particular to strategic enablers, 
such as transport aircraft and ships, drones, and satellites, the development 
of which requires a large critical mass of participating states to take off. 
Individual drones, ships and aircraft could still be owned by individual 
states and even operated by national personnel, but they could be incor-
porated into a single structure with multinational personnel for command, 
logistics, maintenance and training, and subject to a standardised upgrade 
programme. Not only would this reduce duplication between states, but it 
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would also enhance the availability of capabilities for operations, as com-
pared with small, national capabilities, some portion of which is always in 
maintenance. The experience of the European Air Transport Command in 
Eindhoven, which operates the transport fleets of France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the Benelux countries, shows how important efficiency gains can 
be achieved, even without merging logistics and maintenance, which could 
be the next step. 
Combat units could be operated more cost-effectively as well. Even 
Europe’s smaller states could maintain a significant combat capacity if, 
rather than having to field all support units themselves, combat support 
and combat service support were provided through a combination of 
pooling and a division of labour among several states. Belgian–Dutch naval 
cooperation is an example of this model. Manoeuvre units remain nation-
ally staffed: ships sail either under the Belgian flag with a Belgian crew, 
or the Dutch flag with a Dutch crew. But there is only one, pooled, naval 
command and one naval-operations school; and there is a division of labour 
with regard to logistics, maintenance and training, with the Dutch provid-
ing these services for all frigates and the Belgians for all minehunters. 
This dimension of PESCO has received far less attention since 2017 than 
it did in 2010, though one of its (less stringently worded) commitments 
states that members ‘could commit’ to an active role in existing and future 
multinational structures, such as the Eurocorps, meaning that states would 
go beyond interoperability (making sure that their forces can be deployed 
alongside each other) toward integration (creating permanent multinational 
capabilities to support their national forces). Such a move would arguably 
maximise the impact of PESCO. Furthermore, although the Council decision 
states that this commitment does not ‘cover a readiness force, a standing force 
[or] a stand by force’, it is difficult to see how states can meet operations-related 
commitments or make strategically deployable formations available without 
to some degree creating more permanently integrated force packages with 
collective enablers. Without readiness, a force does not constitute a capability. 
If this commitment refers only to the existing EU practice of declaring the 
theoretical availability of non-identified national forces, it is meaningless. 
Instead, integration ought to be wired into PESCO from the start. 
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One of the first 17 PESCO projects to be announced is a Crisis Response 
Operation Core (CROC) that should facilitate force generation for expe-
ditionary operations.9 To achieve this goal, which was first proposed in a 
Franco-German ‘food-for-thought’ paper, a generic contingency plan for a 
crisis-response operation would be developed and a force package derived 
from it that would consist of one land division or three brigades, plus the 
required strategic enablers. Participating states would then assign capabili-
ties to this package, which would be logged in a database to be maintained 
by the EU Military Staff. The list of projects annexed to the Council decision 
states that CROC ‘will decisively contribute to the creation of a coherent full 
spectrum force package’. The original Franco-German paper, however, had 
stated that ‘no concrete names and figures of assigned capabilities/forces are 
foreseen’,10 leading one senior military officer to describe CROC as ‘no more 
than an Excel sheet’. If, by contrast, participating states assign pre-identified 
forces and anchor them permanently in a CROC with pre-assigned enablers, 
this could be the beginning of a move from interoperability to integration. 
PESCO vs other initiatives
Many of the states that have joined PESCO are simultaneously engaged in 
another scheme, NATO’s Framework Nations Concept (FNC), which also 
seeks to promote cooperation and possibly integration. The way in which 
the FNC involves a larger nation offering a framework, such as a corps or 
headquarters, to which smaller nations make specific contributions in the 
collective pursuit of the states’ capability targets, invites a direct compari-
son with PESCO.11 The fact that the FNC was originally a German idea raises 
questions about why it was tabled in NATO rather than the EU. Bringing 
together 19 allies, the German-led FNC group started out with a focus on 
capability development, with sub-groups of various sizes addressing spe-
cific capability areas. It now also functions as a framework for generating 
deployments, notably on Europe’s eastern borders, in the context of NATO’s 
Enhanced Forward Presence there. The extent to which participating states 
are willing to integrate with German forces remains to be seen, although bilat-
eral German–Dutch cooperation between land forces has already progressed 
very far indeed. Dutch armoured and air-mobile units have been anchored 
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within larger German formations, and effectively rely on specific German-
only support elements, which seems to prove that integration can work. 
While Germany takes the lead in the development of the FNC, France 
has launched yet another scheme. The European Intervention Initiative (EII), 
which focuses on territorial defence, was announced by French President 
Emmanuel Macron in a speech at Sorbonne University in September 2017. 
In view of the timing of the speech, which was delivered just as work on 
PESCO was accelerating, many assumed that Macron was referring to CROC, 
but it has since become clear that EII is meant to be a separate scheme falling 
outside the framework of PESCO and even of the EU. Macron apparently 
envisages that, by the beginning of the next decade, participating states will 
have achieved a common intervention force, a common defence budget and 
a common doctrine for action.12 France has initially invited nine countries 
in total to join the scheme (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK), but the precise form the initiative 
will take remains unclear. The emphasis seems to be on doctrine, planning, 
intelligence and strategic culture rather than on force packages. The partici-
pation of the UK would not prevent the launching of the EII as a PESCO 
project, since third-country participation in individual PESCO projects will be 
provided for, and indeed will help the larger projects to achieve critical mass.
The emergence of CROC, the FNC and EII suggests that at least some 
European states are convinced of the need to build more integrated force 
packages. But too many parallel initiatives risk undermining each other. 
Many states are involved in all three projects. If all were to be pursued at 
the same pace, overlap and competition would be bound to occur. It is pos-
sible to make a state’s forces interoperable with many others in the context 
of different frameworks. But as soon as a state moves toward integration, 
choices must be made: a capability that has been integrated into one frame-
work cannot simultaneously be merged with another. Given the importance 
of French and German leadership to the success of PESCO, will they be able 
to take the lead on EII and the FNC at the same time? Who will take the lead 
on CROC? Is PESCO’s top priority territorial defence, or power projection, 
or both? Neither France nor Germany has clarified its ultimate plans. While 
the German foreign ministry and the political leadership of the defence min-
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istry appear to be backing PESCO, many in the Bundeswehr still prioritise 
NATO and the FNC.13 Meanwhile, many within the French defence estab-
lishment seem disillusioned with the EU, believing that only the UK and 
the US can be relied upon in combat. EII could be the result of French disap-
pointment with PESCO, which turned out differently than Paris expected. 
In order to ensure that all initiatives fit together with PESCO, states need 
to be more clear about its purpose, which remains surprisingly vague. The 
established EU practice of pushing on with concrete measures that member 
states can agree on, while leaving the more contentious end goal undefined, 
risks failure in this case, because the ongoing non-EU schemes could hollow 
out PESCO. Without a long-term view, it will be difficult to maintain any 
sort of coherence between successive annual rounds of project proposals, 
let alone to decide what the priority projects should be. Participating states 
need to think carefully about what PESCO might allow them to do that they 
cannot do today. 
PESCO and European security 
The Council decision states only that PESCO members have made commit-
ments to each other ‘with a view to [preparing for] the most demanding 
missions, and contributing to the fulfilment of the Union level of ambi-
tion’. The EU’s military level of ambition has not been updated since 1999, 
however, when the EU adopted the (land-centric) Headline Goal of achiev-
ing the capacity to deploy, and to sustain for at least one year, 60,000 troops, 
with concomitant air and naval support, for expeditionary operations. 
In 2016, the EU Global Strategy (which guides all EU external policies) 
added the qualitative objective of strategic autonomy. In operational 
terms, strategic autonomy means the capacity to undertake certain military 
tasks at all times and therefore, if necessary, alone. The precise nature of 
the operations the EU should be capable of was defined by the Council 
of Ministers, which on 14 November 2016 adopted the Implementation 
Plan on Security and Defence, intended to operationalise the Global 
Strategy. The plan lists an ambitious range of operations, from ‘joint crisis 
management operations in situations of high security risk in the regions 
surrounding the EU’ and ‘joint stabilisation operations, including air and 
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special operations’, through air-security and maritime-security operations, 
to capacity-building. However, it specifies neither how many operations the 
EU should be able to conduct simultaneously, nor the envisaged scale of 
these operations. Member states were not willing to enter into detail, most 
likely because doing so would have revealed that the existing Headline 
Goal, which has not been attained, is actually insufficient to achieve a 
significant degree of concurrency. Moreover, member states have hitherto 
been reluctant to undertake high-intensity operations under the EU flag. 
As a result, the Implementation Plan’s list of operations seems already to 
have been forgotten; military staffers in Brussels refer to it as ‘the annex of 
the annex’. The CROC food-for-thought paper, however, is more explicit, 
translating the existing Headline Goal into a need for a corps headquarters, 
three divisions and nine to 12 brigades, with the three brigades that it calls 
for in the short term constituting only a first step. 
The CSDP was created for expeditionary purposes only, but the Global 
Strategy, besides introducing the need for strategic autonomy, also added a 
new task: the protection of Europe. The idea is not for the EU to take charge 
of collective territorial defence, even though there is a legal basis for this in 
the Lisbon Treaty;14 that will remain the prerogative of NATO. There is a 
range of contingencies, however, that fall below the threshold of NATO’s 
Article V, in which the armed forces have a mostly supporting role to play, 
and which the EU is arguably better placed to address, such as homeland 
security, cyber security and border security. Of course, such contingencies 
exist on a continuum: homeland security may require defeating an enemy 
abroad, such as the Islamic State, in addition to patrolling the streets at 
home; border security may be conditional upon creating a safe and secure 
environment in Europe’s neighbouring countries; and cyber security may 
be the theatre of confrontation that replaces, or precedes, warfare between 
regular forces. Capability requirements sit along a continuum as well: the 
shortfalls in European arsenals identified by NATO and the EU are nearly 
identical. The key to defining PESCO’s place in Europe’s security architec-
ture would be to acknowledge this continuum, and to break through the 
organisational divide between the EU and NATO that hinders any serious 
strategising by Europeans. 
European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance   |  173 
At present, Europe’s capability shortfalls are such that it can neither meet 
its NATO obligations for territorial defence, nor achieve strategic autonomy 
with regard to the protection of Europe and expeditionary operations as 
demanded by the EU Global Strategy. Defence spending is going up in 
nearly all European states, but spending more is not in itself the answer, 
given that the nature and scale of many key shortfalls (notably strategic ena-
blers) is such that no single European state is capable of acquiring sufficient 
capabilities to make a difference. Even if all European states were to spend 
2% of GDP on defence, they would still be dependent on US strategic lift, 
intelligence and more to actually employ their forces. Thus, cooperation and 
integration is needed. By pooling their defence efforts, Europeans can make 
the best use of the available resources to address their forces’ shortfalls. By 
working together to achieve synergies and effects of scale, and by minimis-
ing duplication, they might even do so by spending less than 2% of GDP. 
After all, this spending target should not be seen as an objective in its own 
right: the real aim is to achieve all capability targets. If that can be done for 
less money, so much the better. Of course, spending less than 2% is not an 
objective in its own right either. 
PESCO, NATO and the EU
PESCO could be the single umbrella under which European states engage 
in cooperation and integration to meet all of their capability targets, for both 
NATO and the EU. This is what the 25 PESCO members actually stated 
in the 13 November 2017 notification document in which they announced 
their intention to launch the initiative. According to the document, ‘A long 
term vision of PESCO could be to arrive at a coherent full spectrum force 
package – in complementarity with NATO, which will continue to be the 
cornerstone of collective defence for its members’.15 The Council decision 
did not repeat this wording, but this is precisely what PESCO should (and 
not just could) be. 
Achieving this will require that a number of taboos be broken, and some 
artificial limitations be superseded. The EU, for example, would have to 
accept that developing capabilities within an EU framework does not mean 
that they will necessarily be put to use under the EU flag. The type of capa-
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bilities that PESCO focuses on should therefore not be limited by the kinds 
of operations that states have hitherto undertaken through the EU (which 
have mostly been of a smaller scale and at the lower end of the spectrum), 
nor even by the military tasks of the EU. Instead, PESCO should envisage 
the full spectrum of expeditionary operations, which Europeans can choose 
to conduct through either the EU, the UN or NATO, or as part of an ad 
hoc coalition, depending on the circumstances of each contingency, and 
the full spectrum of capabilities needed for territorial defence. Likewise, 
NATO would have to accept that setting capability targets for each ally does 
not mean that capabilities will necessarily be developed within a NATO 
framework or by each ally separately. In addition 
to working with individual allies, NATO should 
work with European allies and partners as a group16 
that will meet a series of targets collectively. The 
fact that the EU as such is not a member of NATO 
should not be allowed to hinder this work, since the 
most suitable framework for such collective action 
is the EU’s PESCO mechanism.
PESCO’s first list of projects shows that, in practice, it already serves 
both the EU and NATO, even though this has not been stated explicitly. 
Its military-mobility project is a prime example. The aim is to facilitate 
the movement of armed forces across the EU, by tackling both procedural 
obstacles and infrastructure problems (such as roads and bridges that are 
unsuitable for heavy military vehicles). NATO itself used to take charge of 
this, but after the end of the Cold War the existing mechanisms were neither 
updated nor extended to new allies in Central and Eastern Europe. Today, 
the EU is much better placed to assume this responsibility, even though 
the primary objective is to enhance the capacity for rapid reaction in the 
context of collective defence. The project has therefore been explicitly wel-
comed by NATO and the US. The EuroArtillery project is another example. 
Aiming to develop a new mobile precision artillery platform, this capability 
is clearly suited to the type of high-intensity operations that, at least until 
now, European states have conducted through NATO or ad hoc coalitions 
rather than the EU. 
PESCO in practice 
serves both the 
EU and NATO
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Since PESCO already serves both expeditionary operations and territo-
rial defence, there is no need to choose between them (or indeed homeland 
security), nor to create additional schemes outside PESCO. States that today 
are mostly concerned with the defence of their territory, such as Finland and 
Poland, as well as states that are focusing more on operations abroad, such 
as Belgium, could pursue their defence policies within the PESCO frame-
work. This is not to say that PESCO’s participating states will need to do 
everything together, in every capability area. It would be perfectly possible, 
in the field of land capabilities, to create two cores within PESCO. France 
could bring EII under the PESCO umbrella, merge it with the CROC project, 
and take the lead in building an integrated multinational force package 
geared towards expeditionary operations, from which forces could be gen-
erated quickly in times of crisis. Germany could likewise bring the FNC 
group under the PESCO umbrella and continue with the integration of a 
force package geared toward territorial defence. The idea would not be a 
strict division of labour: France and Germany should obviously engage in 
both cores (as they do in operational terms, with German troops deployed 
in Mali and French troops in Lithuania). This would rather be a division 
of leadership, with each country taking the lead in the project that fits best 
with its strategic culture. France and Germany together, with Italy and 
Spain, should propose projects to acquire the strategic enablers required to 
support all operations. In this way, contrasting dynamics would strengthen 
rather than undermine each other. 
By using PESCO as the sole umbrella for multinational capability devel-
opment, complete consistency between the EU and NATO could be assured. 
Although the NDPP and the EU’s Capability Development Plan logically 
identify the same shortfalls, they do not necessarily produce the same 
order of priorities. More importantly, ensuring the strategic autonomy of 
Europe is not an objective of the NDPP, which currently sets targets only 
for individual allies and for NATO as a whole, without guaranteeing that 
the European allies (and partners) will be able to conduct certain operations 
autonomously. Putting the EU and NATO targets together would allow the 
PESCO states to create a capability mixture that enables them, on the one 
hand, to assume their share of the burden of collective defence and to con-
176  |  Sven Biscop
tribute to expeditionary operations together with other allies; and, on the 
other hand, to ensure European security and to launch by themselves the 
expeditionary operations identified by the EU level of ambition. 
In this context, the European states that belong both to NATO and PESCO 
should consider merging the two National Implementation Plans they cur-
rently have – one detailing how they will achieve NATO’s ‘Wales pledge’ 
of spending 2% of GDP on defence, and the other detailing how they will 
meet the PESCO commitments – to produce a single plan. This plan would 
be systematically assessed by NATO, via the established NDPP, and by the 
EU, which has launched a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence that 
will focus on the extent to which states have harmonised requirements and 
engaged in collaborative projects. 
NATO targets are of course well established. As for the EU targets, the 
November 2016 Implementation Plan already identifies the types of opera-
tions that Europeans should be able to run on their own. Quantitatively, the 
existing Headline Goal could continue to be used, since the fact it will now 
have to be achieved without the UK means that it actually represents an 
increased level of ambition for the 25 PESCO states. If the EU were to achieve 
a degree of strategic autonomy thanks to PESCO, it would be able to assume 
first-line responsibility for crises in its neighbourhood (that remain below 
the threshold of Article V), without having to rely on US assets. It could then 
also take the lead politically and address crises according to its own values 
and interests. The US, in turn, could focus its strategy and capabilities on its 
own priorities. In other words, PESCO would help the European allies and 
partners to achieve the more equitable burden-sharing within NATO that 
the US has been demanding for so long. 
PESCO and the US
It therefore came as a surprise to many European officials and observ-
ers when, on the eve of the NATO Defence Ministers Meeting in Brussels 
on 14–15 February 2018, first the US and then NATO Secretary-General 
Jens Stoltenberg suddenly voiced concerns about PESCO.17 Kay Bailey 
Hutchison, US ambassador to NATO, stated that the EU’s defence plans 
should not lead to a duplication of NATO, nor create transatlantic economic 
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barriers. This view of European defence harks back to Madeleine Albright’s 
initial negative reaction to the idea in the late 1990s, at which time she called 
for no duplication, no discrimination and no decoupling.18 Yet at least since 
2008 (the final year of George W. Bush’s second term as president), the US 
has had a much more pragmatic view, seeming to be saying to Europeans 
that ‘if you want to continue merely talking about European defence, don’t 
waste our time; but if you want to really do something about it, by all means, 
go ahead – we welcome any scheme that produces more capability, regard-
less of its logo’. 
If the current US administration has reverted to the more critical view, 
perhaps that is because of its strong focus on trade and a fear that PESCO will 
negatively affect American defence exports to Europe. It is one of PESCO’s 
avowed objectives to strengthen the European defence industry, but even 
as it urges its members to ‘buy European’, this does not mean ‘buy only 
European’, especially as the European and American defence industries 
are closely intertwined. Still, strategic autonomy does also imply indus-
trial autonomy. Surely nobody in the US sincerely expects the European 
allies to use increases in their defence budgets only on the purchase of more 
American equipment? 
A strong plea by European leaders in favour of European defence, notably 
at the Munich Security Conference immediately after the NATO Defence 
Ministerial in 2018, shows that Washington has misjudged the mood in 
Brussels. It would be in the interests of the US, the EU and NATO alike if 
Washington adopted a more constructive attitude. In autumn 2017, when 
PESCO was still in the making, it was apparently suggested by members 
of US Defense Secretary James Mattis’s inner circle that NATO might be 
granted observer status within PESCO. Such a suggestion is certain to raise 
hackles among those who prefer to maintain strict barriers between the EU 
and NATO, but it is just the kind of cross-cutting idea that is needed to max-
imise the performance of the stove-piped European security architecture. 
The NATO–EU relationship is already more transparent than it used to be: 
for example, NATO has been invited to the first set of bilateral meetings 
under the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence between the European 
Defence Agency and the individual PESCO states, in order to discuss their 
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first National Implementation Plans. Offering NATO permanent-observer 
status within PESCO’s central governance bodies would serve to solidify 
PESCO’s role as the sole platform for multinational European capability 
development for both the EU and NATO. At the same time, the EU could be 
given a permanent-observer seat at the North Atlantic Council, thus creat-
ing full mutual transparency. 
It could be argued that US concern can be taken as a good sign, dem-
onstrating that PESCO has real potential – if it didn’t, the US wouldn’t be 
worrying about it. As with any complex scheme, it is possible to think of 
many reasons why it might not work, but it is too early to predict its failure. 
PESCO is qualitatively different from other schemes and could succeed 
where others have failed, but only if its member states (especially France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain) sustain an active leadership role and refrain 
from diluting it through uncoordinated parallel schemes. The role of the 
European Commission will also be crucial. One thing is certain: if European 
states want to significantly increase their military capacity, or even attain 
some degree of strategic autonomy, a collaborative scheme is the only 
option. They need to give PESCO a chance. 
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